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COLERIDGEAN POLARITY AND THEOLOGICAL VISION
James S. Cutsinger
University of South Carolina

This essay concerns two closely related subjects: the religious philosophy of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the need for a new vision in
Christian theology today. Though it is the second, more ambitious and
adventurous topic that deserves the more sensitive treatment, it is
rather to Coleridge himself that I have given the greater part of my
attention. The reasoning behind this procedure is based upon a fairly
simple fact: Coleridge's religious thought is still largely unknown to
most people in the philosophical and theological communities. During
the past twenty years or so, as many of Coleridge's hitherto unpublished notebooks and other manuscripts have been brought to light, a
number of scholars of English literature have begun to study his
thought, including his theology, with greater care.1 But it is still rare to
find a researcher outside literature per se who knows much of
Coleridgean philosophy, beyond (perhaps) a few phrases from his
theory of the imagination in the Biographia Literaria.1 I have thought it
!j Robert Barth, S J , and Thomas McFarland may be mentioned especially in this
connection See, respectively, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge Harvard
University, 1969) and Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford Clarendon, 1969)
2
The best known of Coleridge's observations on the imagination can be found in the
thirteenth chapter of the Biographia
The IMAGINATION then, I consider either as primary, or secondary The
primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of
all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal
act of creation m the infinite I AM The secondary Imagination I consider
as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as
identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in
degree, and in the mode of its operation It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in
order to recreate, or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all
events it struggles to idealize and to unify It is essentially \itaU even as all
objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead (Biographia Literaria, J
Shawcross, ed [Oxford Oxford University, 1907] 1 202)
One finds this passage quoted frequently in recent works dealing with the theological ima-
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advisable, accordingly, to devote the larger portion of this paper to
describing some of the salient features of Coleridge's thought, and to
do so in the special light provided by one of his most powerful ideas,
the idea of polarity. Nevertheless, I would also hope to call attention
throughout to the second, constructive topic, to the need for a new
vision in theology. Though I shall be only briefly sketching this vision
in a direct way toward the end of the essay, I would ask the reader to
recognize, even from the beginning, that Coleridge is attempting to
awaken nothing other than a possible way of seeing God.
I
The student of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 — 1834) knows well
with what incredible persistence this philosopher and poet emphasized,
as the guiding theme and chief object of his thought, the transformation of one's vision. Coleridge, by his own admission, had seen the
world anew, and he wished for his interlocutors and readers to share
that vision through the development of their own powers of reflection.
He aimed always, therefore, whether in verse or prose, "so to represent
familiar objects as to awaken the minds of others to a like freshness of
sensation concerning them." 3 "You are going," Coleridge warned his
reader,
not indeed in search of the New World, like Columbus and his adventurers,
nor yet an other world, that is to come, but in search of the other world that
now is, and ever has been though undreamt of by the Many, and by the
greater part even of the Few 4

But the student of Coleridge remembers, too, the unparalleled
importance that he attached throughout his thinking to the question of
unity. Like many another romantic of his day, Coleridge was concerned to pierce through custom and habit, what he called "the film of
familiarity and selfish solicitude,"5 in order to see a unity and wholeness of things more inward than surfaces and deeper, hence, than the
mutual exclusions of materialism and mechanism and of material and

gination. As but one among numerous examples, see Ray L. Hart, Unfinished Man and
the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1968) 200 As I hope to show, the imagination is only the tip of a Coleridgean
iceberg.
3
The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (general editor):
Vol 4, The Friend, ed. Barbara Rooke (Princeton Princeton University, 1969); quotation
from 1 110
4
Coleridge on Logic and Learning: With Selections from the Unpublished Manuscripts, e
Alice D. Snyder (New Haven: Yale University. 1929) 1.
5
Biographia Literaria, 2. 6.
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mechanical things: a unity that would preserve also, however, the fullness and abundance of the nature he loved. We may consider his
theory of the imagination, with its "esemplastic" or unity-making
power, or his thought about life and organicism, or his propaedeutic
"distinction in kind" between the reason and the understanding.6 But
in all cases, we find that Coleridge's method is a method attempting
always to disclose a unity, though not identity, among the seeming
irreducibles of a dividing vision: a unity of the one and the many,
sameness and difference, subject and object, self and other, activity and
passivity.
Now each of these important facets of Coleridge's thought—the
transformation of vision and the search for unity—has been discussed
many times by scholars of his work. Each is especially well known to
the interpreter of the romantic imagination. And yet, studies of
Coleridge have not reflected a full awareness of the essential, vital relationship between these two facets. There has not been a decisive
recognition that unity marks the way, the method or exercise, by which
Coleridge would have us approach his vision and discover "the other
world that now is." It has not been fully seen, in other words, that
oneness gives form to his transformed vision. Indeed, the study of
Coleridge's work lacks particularly a theological approach to this question. For the end to which transformation and unity are meant to lead
his reader, as they led him, is nothing less than the knowledge of God.
As John Muirhead observed, "There is a sense in which Coleridge's
whole philosophy was a Philosophy of Religion. He was himself willing
to speak of it as a Theosophy, even as a Theognosy—a knowledge of
God, to which all other knowledges led up." J. Robert Barth, S.J.,
shares the same perception. For Coleridge, Barth writes, "all
knowledge is ultimately one, whether it be scientific, poetic, philosophical, or religious, and the capstone of all knowledge for him is
knowledge of God." 7
Through the transformation of his vision, Coleridge had glimpsed a
world translucent to deity. He had found, in short, that revisioning
one's world could mean the very en-visioning of God. But such a
transformation cannot be effected, Coleridge believed, apart from
6
Colendge speaks of the ''esemplasti^ ' power of the imagination in the Biographia
Literaria, 1 107; for his theory of life, see the whole of his "Formation of a More
Comprehensive Theory of Life," Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge, ed Donald A.
Statiner (New York Random House, 1951) 558 — 606, for examples of Coleridge's distinction between reason and understanding, see The Friend, 1. 514 — 20 and Aids to
Reflection, ed Henry Nelson Coleridge (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1971) 211-25.
7
John H. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (New York: Humanities, 1930) 217, J.
Robert Barth, S.J., The Symbolic imagination: Coleridge and the Romantic Tradition (Princeton. Princeton University, 1977) 11.
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exercising and strengthening our capacity to see true unity—nor, therefore, apart from our capacity to see ''distinctly" rather than "dividedly," "it being the business of philosophy," as he said, "ever to
distinguish without unnaturally dividing."8 This ability to see
distinctly—to see the inward, and not just superficial, relationship of
things—becomes in fact the means or medium through which the
knowledge of God is transmitted and the experiential basis, therefore,
of Coleridgean theology. Indeed, to see the unity among "familiar"
things was for him at once also to see the unity of those things and
God. To awaken thus "the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom" was to discover "the loveliness and wonders of the world before
us," a world diaphanous to God.9
One finds in reading Coleridge, however, that his sense of unity is
most unusual, that it aims expressly to call into question our taken-forgranted view of relationships. Certainly, one of the simplest and most
fatuous of platitudes is the call for unity, and Coleridge seems to have
been well aware of that fact. "I am sure," he confesses in one of his
early memorandum-books, "that two very different meanings if not
more lurk in the word, one."10 And he believed that finding the truest
and most adequate meaning could spell the difference between real
transformation and just another custom-honoring cliché. A large part
of the interpreter's work must consist, therefore, in trying to follow
Coleridge in his thinking about this first and most basic of ideas, in
searching for a distinctively Coleridgean unity. One of the most
rewarding of these searches may be conducted in pursuit of the unityaffirming concept that Coleridge calls "polarity."
Perhaps the most important thing to realize first about Coleridge's
interest in polar unity is that it was an interest totally oblivious to the
boundaries among disciplines and subjects. His descriptions and
definitions of this idea were forever cutting across the most widely
differentiated areas of concern, and his illustrations of polarity were
drawn from every corner. The following, taken from one of his letters,
is an excellent example of this fact. Coleridge's correspondent, I am
sure, must have felt, in reading the letter, that he was caught in a
kaleidoscope. "The Alphabet of Physics no less than of Metaphysics,
of Physiology no less than of Psychology is an Alphabet of Relations, in
which Ν is Ν only because M is M and O, O. The reality of all
alike"—the reader will notice here a first clue to the theological
8
The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (New
York Philosophical Library, 1949) 268.
9
Biographia Literaria, 2 6
10
The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed Kathleen Coburn (New York:
Pantheon, 1961) vol 2, entry 2332.
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dimension of polar experience—"is the A and Ω, far rather that
Ineffable which is neither Alpha separately, nor Omega separately, nor
Alpha and Omega by composition." Composition, as we shall see, is
among the species of false unity. No, the reality of all, he continues, is
that alone which "can become an object of Consciousness or Thought,
even as all the powers of the material world can become objects of Per
ception, only as two Poles or Counterpoints of the same Line."11 To put
the matter somewhat more simply, the reality of all, had we but eyes to
see it, is polar.
The second thing one has to understand about Coleridge is the
nature of his method. Coleridge's most basic and self-conscious allegi
ance was to Plato, and, through Plato, to the Socratic maieusis or
midwifery, to the need for getting a person involved in the search for
truth. Coleridge aimed in all his work, therefore (in words he used,in
fact, to describe the method of Plato's education),
not to assist in storing the passive mind with the various sorts of knowledge
most in request, as if the human soul were a mere repository or
banqueting-room, but to place it in such relations of circumstance as should
gradually excite the germinal power that craves no knowledge but what it
can take up into itself, what it can appropriate, and re-produce m fruits of its
own. 12

In order to excite his readers' minds in this way, Coleridge's
method involved providing certain occasions or "Landing-Places"13 in
his writing where the reader would be called upon to exercise his own
reflection and to become imaginatively involved in the circumstance or
event or idea that Coleridge was describing. One such Landing-Place,
found in the Biographia Literaria, has long been a favorite with me. I
quote it in full because I think it can help prepare us to appreciate more
thoroughly the definition of polarity that I shall then be turning to.
The following quotation is meant to signify polarity-in-action, as it
were, or "experienced" polarity, by recreating in us the feeling of bal
ance. As before, we shall see that Coleridge is not one to respect topi
cal limitations:
In every voluntary movement we first counteract gravitation, in order to
avail ourselves of it. It must exist, that there may be a something to be
counteracted, and which, by its re-action, may aid the force that is exerted
to resist it. Let us consider what we do when we leap. We first resist the

11

Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (Oxford: Claren
don, 1959) 4. 688.
12
The Friend, 1.473
,3
This descriptive phrase is taken from The Friend, where such "Landing-Places'' were
frequently employed.
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gravitating power by an act purely voluntary, and then by another act,
voluntary in part, we yield to it in order to light on the spot, which we had
previously proposed to ourselves Now let a man watch his mind while he
is composing, or, to take a still more common case, while he is trying to
recollect a name, and he will find the process completely analogous Most
of my readers will have observed a small water-insect on the surface of
rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic
colours on the sunny bottom of the brook, and will have noticed, how the
little animal wins its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of active
and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in
order to gather strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion
This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other
are active and passive, and this is not possible without an intermediate
faculty, which is at once both active and passive 14

But let us turn now to the idea, rather than the experience, of
polarity. Perhaps the most succinct of Coleridge's definitions of the
idea is one deposited, with typical cunning, in a footnote to one of the
numbers of his periodical The Friend:
EVERY POWER IN NATURE AND IN SPIRIT must evolve an opposite, as
the sole means and condition of its manifestation. AND ALL OPPOSITION IS
A TENDENCY TO RE-UNION This is the universal Law of Polarity or
essential Dualism 15

If this law is to be grasped, one must recognize, first of all, which of
the two opposite meanings of polarity Coleridge intends. For polarity is
to be numbered among that strange collection of words, including the
English "cleave" and the German aujheben (which Hegel found so felicitous), whose meanings comprise two antonyms. At the one extreme,
a polar relationship may mean a relationship between antagonists, a
relationship robbed of unity altogether. This sense of the term is
clearest, perhaps, in the verb "polarize." It is said, for example, that
parties have been polarized in an international dispute. In this case,
polarity tends to double for the words "conflict" and "enmity." When
used in this fashion, the poles in question are seen predominantly as
independent and "polemical" individuals. Polarity may therefore come
to mean precisely the opposite of harmony, cooperation, and unity;
what the poles have in common may be no more than the fact that they
have nothing in common, that they tend only to draw away from one
another. The vocabulary of existentialism, with its encounters and
estrangements, would seem to have made this sense of the word the
most common. This sense is involved, for instance, when Gordon
14

Biographia Literana, 1 85 — 86
The Friend, 1 94n

15
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Kaufman speaks of the epistemological polarity between subject and
object. "Neither the subject nor the object pole can be reduced one to
the other," Kaufman writes:
We encounter the object only in its opposition to, and limitation of, our
strivings. Hence, in a very real sense, objective nature must always be
strange or foreign to us, something which we can know only superficially,
i.e., something of which we can know only the ς 'surfaces,'' the external side
which we encounter, but which we can never know from within 1 6

Here polarity means that one thing cannot be fully united with another
thing, that the fusion of idem et alter, the same with the different, the
familiar and fresh, for purposes of revealing the true unity Coleridge
desires, is not possible.
But, on the other hand, the word's original application to magne
tism may be emphasized. One may then attend, not to the separation
of antagonistic poles, but to the oneness of poles within a magnetic
field, or (by extension) to the literal and metaphorical fact that "opposites attract." Coleridge repeatedly focuses our attention upon this
meaning of the word, as when he writes:
Polarity is not a Composite Force, or vis terna constituted by the moments
of two counter-agents. It is 1 manifested in 2, not 1 + 1 = 2. . . The
polar forces are the two forms, in which a one Power works in the same act
and instant. Thus, it is not the Power, Attraction and the Power Repulsion
at once tugging and tugging like two sturdy Wrestlers that compose the
Magnet; but The Magnetic Power working at once positively and negatively.
Attraction and Repulsion are the two Forces of the one magnetic Power.17

Here the poles are seen, not so much in light of opposition or discord,
but as parts of one thing, of a unity, whether it is a magnet, an electric
current, or a gravitational globe. Polarity in this case entails harmony
and cooperation, with one pole supplying what the other lacks and vice
versa. Such poles complement or complete one another and are
required for each other's existence. This meaning is today more com
monly employed, it seems, in scientific discussions, where positive and
negative electrical charges are believed to support and stabilize each
other, as in the structure of an atom.
Of course, this second meaning of polarity includes, more than it
opposes, the first meaning. Although it centers our attention on unity
and harmonious relationship, we are not allowed to forget that there is
16

Relativism, Knowledge, and Faith (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960) 34
Quoted by Owen Barfield in What Coleridge Thought (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University, 1971) 203 n. 24. I must acknowledge my great debt to Mr. Barfield for his
incomparable assistance, both scholarly and personal, in all of my work on Coleridge
17
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an opposition, though not a contradiction or exclusion, within that
unity, that there is an alter, even though the idem is the alter. Polarity
thus prevents the experience of oneness from collapsing into a blank
and undifferentiated identity; it prevents the collapse, in Coleridge's
terms, of unity into "unicity."18 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Coleridge employed polarity, in keeping with its second
sense, as a way of expressing his own, distinctive understanding of oneness. For as we observed earlier, he believed above all that a true perception of unity must preserve the diversity and fullness of the things
unified. The Coleridgean "one" exists, not at the expense of the
many, but through the many and as their harmony. Polarity was,
accordingly, a pivotal idea to Coleridge in describing his transformed
vision. Only in a vision informed by polar relations could the same,
the commonplace and familiar, really be transformed and become
different, for only there was difference not excluded, even in fusion.
Two entries from Coleridge's early notebooks help to reinforce the
second meaning of polarity, while illustrating well his characteristically
romantic expression of wholeness. The first passage describes his
vision of the sea while aboard a ship bound for Malta, the other the
topography of a Coleridgean country walk.
O said I as I looked on the blue, yellow, green, & purple green Sea, with all
its hollows & swells, & cut-glass surfaces—O what an Ocean of lovely
forms!—and I was vexed, teazed, that the sentence sounded like a play of
Words. But it was not, the mind within me was struggling to express the
marvellous distinctness & unconfounded personality of each of the million
millions of forms, & yet the undivided Unity in which they subsisted.19
Still as I rise, 1 am more & more enamoured of the marvellous playfulness
of the Surface of the Hills/such swellings, startings, sinkings, and yet all so
combined as to make it impossible to look at as many/no! it was a manifold One\20

If we are to appreciate fully the meaning of polarity, "the manifestation of one power by opposite forces,"21 it is most important that we
pay special attention, in both of these quotations, to the conjunction
"yet." For in each case, "yet" signals the fact that Coleridge has
expressed a conjunction of the many running against the grain of what
we would normally expect. I must pause to emphasize this point, lest
,8it
Unity or unition, and indistinguishable unicity or sameness," writes Coleridge, "are
incompatible terms. We never speak of the unity of attraction, or the unity of repulsion,
but of the unity of attraction and repulsion" (Aids to Reflection, 206 —7nn.).
19
Notebooks, vol. 2, entry 2344.
20
Ibid., entry 2705.
21
The Friend, 1.479.
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our common materialistic assumptions—and Coleridge believes we are
all materialists and mechanists—make for misinterpretation. We must
recognize first and foremost that the unity Coleridge believes he has
seen on board ship and in the hills of the English countryside is a unity
that can be seen and expressed only in spite of our customary, empirical perception of things: a perception in which a thing is what it is, not
through another or because of another, but because it is not another
thing, a perception ratified in the A or not-A of Aristotelian logic.
Polarity is meant to highlight the "yet," to highlight the true unity of
the tertium that is normally thought to be non datur. Whatever else it
might be, Coleridge's unity must remain á mystery to a merely empirical perception. The "distinctness & unconfounded personality" that it
preserves remain "marvellous" indeed. And thus, polarity not only
prevents the collapse of unity into unicity; it also guards against our
thinking of "one" in ways conformable to the ordinary, the material
and atomic, the untransformed.
This second function is crucial, for everyone's persistent temptation, Coleridge believes, is to assume that what is meant by unity is
consistent always with a mechanical scheme of parts and wholes.
Things having discrete surfaces, he insists, have come to dominate our
thinking. We are "finger-philosophers . . . , snails in intellect who wear
their eyes at the tips of their feelers, and cannot even see unless they at
the same time touch."22 A certain number of gears, a certain number of
nuts and bolts, plus an assortment of pulleys, make for one complete
machine; just so, we mistakenly assume, many waves make one sea,
and many hills one landscape. As we shall presently see, such
indiscreet applications of discreteness can be, and have been, extended
even to the unity of God, man, and world. But such mechanical
wholes are not the many that are yet, that are nevertheless, one. The
oneness of Coleridge's many is instead a oneness counter to collection
and simple aggregation, and thus counter also to what we ordinarily
mean by "many." Manyness is predicated in our everyday,
unreflective experience, Coleridge observes, upon the possibility of
empirical visibility and, hence, upon the sense-perception of discontinuous positions and distances. But the Coleridgean "one," though it
embraces waves and hills, and God and man, is one in spite of such
perceptions.
It is this polar oneness that occupies the central place when
Coleridge distinguishes "vital" philosophy and true unity from the
"mechanic" philosophy's unity of juxtaposition. Here is provided as
^"Magnanimity," in Omniana, or Horae otiosiores, by Robert Southey and S Τ
Coleridge (London, 1812) sect 129
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good a synopsis of the untransformed and transformed visions as the
interpreter may find. "The leading differences between mechanic and
vital philosophy may all be drawn from one point," writes Coleridge.
The former, demanding for every mode and act of existence real or possible
visibility, knows only of distance and nearness, composition (or rather juxtaposition) and decomposition, in short the relations of unproductive particles
to each other, so that in every instance the result is the exact sum of the
component quantities, as in arithmetical addition This is the philosophy of
death, and only of a dead nature can it hold good. In life [here is the
source of transformation] much more in spirit, and m a living and spiritual
philosophy, the two component counter-powers actually interpenetrate each
other, and generate a higher third, including both the former, ita tarnen ut
sit alia et major [so that, nevertheless, it may be other and greater].23

Where before we noted the importance of the conjunction "yet," here
the Latin tarnen, nevertheless, turns our sense of surface inside out.
For no mind under (what Coleridge called) the "despotism" of the
empirical eye24 and a slave to mutual exclusions can think the meaning
of a word like interpénétration—a word that demands of two united
somethings that they be inside each other. No materialist, therefore,
without being thrown back against the source of his assumptions, can
begin to experience the reality of a oneness in which the elements are
themselves, nevertheless alia, not themselves.
Coleridge's interpénétration, it should be noticed, is not the same
as interlocking or intertwining or any number of similar conceptions in
which the components are allowed to retain their original solidity and
substantial integrity. Interpénétration, and thus polarity, aims instead
to violate the deepest of all our assumptions: our habitual understanding of material things as based upon virtually every act, every movement that we perform as bodily beings. The sensation of taking up
room in the world, the feeling of resistance to muscular exertion at the
surface of our skin, in everything from walking to breathing, "weighs"
heavily (it is even in our language) upon all our ways of knowing and
conceiving. We have no need to be taught conceptually that most basic
of Newtonian principles, that two bodies cannot occupy the same space
at the same time: the feeling is in our bones.
Coleridge is convinced, however, that the feeling may change, or,
at least, that its unwarranted hegemony over our thoughts can be made
to subside. And it is with such words as interpénétration, together with
their various descriptions and exhibitions, that Coleridge aims,
23
The Collected Works, ed Coburn. Vol 6, Lay Sermons, ed. R J. White (Princeton.
Princeton University, 1972). "The Statesman's Manual," 89.
24
Biographia Literaria, 1. 74.
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maieutically, to awaken a novel feeling and fresh experience and to teach
the possibility of a relationship and a unity more intimate than that permitted by solids. For in order to interpenetrate, as polarity requires,
and not just to interlock, each of two related things must give up its
boundedness and sacrifice a part of its own integrity in another's behalf.
The point or area of the "surface" of a given thing where it penetrates
another thing and, in so doing, exercises its own outwardly directed
power—the place at which it resists and pushes into the other's
substance—is also the very point or area of its own "surface" where it
is itself pierced and entered, where it gives way to another's outwardly
directed power. Clearly, the meaning of "surface," as the quotation
marks are meant to suggest, must itself be thoroughly transformed.
And thus, the interpénétration of polar opposites, when it becomes a
matter of direct experience, compels us to see our world of former
solids very differently and, hence, to see a different world, a world, in
fact, that is conformable to the being of him who prayed that all might
be one "even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee." 25 The conformability between polar vision and the person of Christ is no accident.
It was the Logos himself, himself in polar relation to the Father, whom
Coleridge regarded as the principle of every polarity, every idem et alter,
throughout creation. For "in this first substantial intelligible distinction
(ό λόγος)," he writes, "all other distinctions that can subsist in the
indivisible unity . . . are included." 26
II
It is here at last, in view of this special Christological application of
polarity, that we can begin to see, perhaps, how the Coleridgean revisioning of unity may involve also a revisioning of theology. For it is
here that we may first glimpse a possible solution to the chief problem
facing today's theologian: the problem of the knowledge of God. To
put the matter more precisely, and yet more boldly, I offer the follow
ing thesis: Only with a Coleridgean experience of interpénétration and
polar unity can theology begin to renew its proper work, its talk of
God, for only thus, I would argue, can it begin to speak its language on
grounds that are equally beyond the reach of skepticism and faithful to
Christian tradition.
The problem of knowledge, any knowledge, when phenomenologically considered, is a problem of barriers or dividing surfaces. To
25

John 17-21
Quoted from Coleridge's fragmentary manuscript Opus Maximum by James D
Boulger in Coleridge as Religious Thinker (New Haven. Yale University, 1961) 139
26
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question or doubt the truth of what seems to be known is to suspect
that we are, in some sense, cut off and alienated from a world "out
there." Reality is sensed to be removed from seeming by a concealing
curtain or wall. The labels we use in describing this dividing surface
are unimportant. We can speak of the epistemological barrier between
the subject and the object of knowledge—as Gordon Kaufman did
above—or, more existentially perhaps, of a dividing partition between
the self and the other. And we can assemble these and their related
cognitive and moral dilemmas together under the customary umbrellas
of "Cartesian dualism" and "existential estrangement."
It is important, of course, that we be reminded of the theological
consequences of such barriers. The oppressive feeling that our world is
divided into parts seems to have generated an equally oppressive set of
dividing surfaces between that world itself and God. Skepticism has
made it appear, on the horizontal, as it were, that ours is a world of us
and them: that there is, on the one hand, a region continuous with the
self or subject, flowing under the direction of its own power and
activity; and, on the other hand, a second region, discontinuous with
the self or subject, possessing unknown and unknowable motions and
configurations of its own. This sense of division has, in turn, come to
express itself theologically in a number of all-too-familiar vertical
dichotomies. The problem of knowledge has here made itself felt as a
limiting surface between the immanent and the transcendent, reason
and revelation, the secular and the sacred, the scientific and the religious, and the natural and the supernatural. Just such an experience of
impenetrability allows David Tracy, for example, to echo the thoughts
of most of his theological contemporaries. "The modern theologian,"
Tracy writes,
is not merely a theologian intellectually troubled by certain traditional Christian cognitive beliefs, nor even is he just ethically disturbed by the imperatives to obedience or the presumptions for belief which traditional theological practice manifested. Rather, that theologian finds that his basic faith, his
fundamental attitude towards reality, is the same faith shared implicitly or
explicitly by his secular contemporaries. No more than they, can he allow
belief m a "supernatural" realm of ultimate significance or in a supernatural
God who seems, in the end, indifferent to the ultimate significance of our
actions. Such beliefs do not represent his faith, his basic understanding of
existence, his fundamental commitments.

These fundamental commitments, Tracy explains, are no longer to the
supernatural God of Christian tradition, but to "the ultimate
significance and final worth of our lives, our thoughts, and actions, here
and now, in nature and in history"—our lives, that is, on the "bottom"
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side of the great divide.27
In general—and keeping in mind the exaggerated simplicity of all
generalizations—it would seem that there have been two basic solutions
to the problem of skepticism in modern theology. In their efforts to
maintain the validity of language about God, theologians have tended
to proceed chiefly in two distinct directions and to locate that which is
meant by "God" in two different places. The first group has in general
proceeded along a path from humanity to divinity and has used its
language about God to refer to something that is characteristically subjective. God has been located primarily in the first of the two regions
just mentioned, the one on the near side of the cognitive divide: a
region, as I said, continuous with the human self or subject. A second
group, on the other hand, has tended to move in its thinking from
divinity to humanity and has spoken of God as something exclusively
objective. God has been located by this group on the far side of the
cognitive divide: a region discontinuous with the self or subject and
possessing (by human aid alone) unknown and unknowable
configurations of its own.
My talk of two groups, of course, is meant to suggest what may be
broadly described as, on the one hand, the program of protestant
liberalism and Roman Catholic modernism and, on the other hand, the
program of neo-orthodoxy. One may recall what Peter Berger has
called, respectively the "reductive" and "deductive" methods.28 But
here, too, the labels we use are not especially important. Each reader
will think of different theologians and different theologies that illustrate
best the two, diverse theological programs that I have in mind. What is
crucial is that we be aware of the way in which both methods, far from
overcoming the problem of doubt, have in fact helped to accentuate the
problem by maintaining the initial barriers and strengthening the
experience of surface and separation. For insofar as they have distinguished themselves from one another primarily by the location of
their Gods—the one within, the other outside, the compartment framed
by subjectivity—both groups have continued to honor the very framework of thinking that produced modern skepticism in the first place,
and both have done so, I believe, because they have failed to appropriate the experiential possibility of Coleridge's polar unity. The Eastern
Orthodox thinker S. L. Frank puts the problem this way:

27

David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1975) 8.
28
The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (Garden
City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1979) chaps. 3 and 4.
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The dilemma [of skepticism] . . is a misunderstanding due to the naive
materialistic idea that our "soul" or self is a kind of sealed vessel with an
opening that connects it with the external world, while within it is entirely
self-contained and clothed, as it were, in an impenetrable sheath. Starting
with this assumption, people either seek for God among the contents of the
external world or declare him to be an "illusion,'' i.e. merely a mental
state, an element or product of our own inner life. But the soul is not a
sealed vessel: there is a fathomless depth in it, and in that depth it is open
to God and m contact with him. . . Faith is the experience of the most
intimate possession which is of the nature of merging and mutual penetration.29

Though the liberal method has never wished to say that God is "merely
a mental state," and though neo-orthodoxy has never been so naive as
to search for God among "the contents of the external world," I do
think we can see in these two programs the tendency Frank describes, a
tendency emerging from these methods' common sense of separateness
and division, and from their incapacity for "mutual penetration."
Theology in any age requires at least two things: knowledge and
divinity. If there is no knowledge of God—if, that is, man is without
any cognitive assurance that "God" refers to something real—then
theology collapses; it is without its necessary logos. There must be, in
other words, some medium or connection or continuity between its
object and its source in the human mind if theology is to be anything
more than babbling. On the other hand, theology remains, if not an
empty word, then surely an idolatrous enterprise, if what it knows is
not truly divine. Though there be ever so much continuity, and though
man be assured of the reality of the object of his talk, his talk is not
theology unless this Being possesses that uncontrollable Something—
that greater value, power, existence: in short, that rf/scontinuity with
man and his world—normally signified by "God." Without this, theology is without its equally necessary theos.
Continuity and discontinuity are alike indispensable if language
about God is to be language about God. Yet it is precisely the full, perceptual unity of both these needed elements that seems today so often
lacking. We seem quite able, some of us, to think of God as a something within; and we seem quite able, too, some of us, to think of God
as a something without. I dare say, in fact, that many of us fancy ourselves able, and perhaps are able, to think theologically in both
respects. But what seems too often absent in theological thought is a
language based upon the experiential fact of a God whose being transcends the categories of in and out themselves, a God who is perceived
to be beyond even the most sophisticated conflation of all the
29
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conceptions of in and out. The necessary notions and vocabularies are
not lacking to current discourse, after all. It is in fact quite easy to say,
and many are saying, that true divinity must be both immanent and
transcendent, or relative and absolute. But it is even easier, I suspect,
in proportion as our substantives become more erudite, to mistake the
lowly conjunction "both" for the "mechanic," and hence Nestorian,
"both" of salt and pepper. Some readers may be thinking that a fresh
consideration of Hegel, or that process-thought, at least, with its explicit talk of dipolarity, can make the necessary contributions to the unity
Coleridge is searching for, and perhaps they can. Coleridge makes it
clear, however, that whatever conceptual method we choose, if it is to
be theologically successful, must begin its work at the perceptual level
first, by challenging, not so much our traditional systems and ideologies, as our common sense—our nearly universal experience of palpable
separateness and division—and that it must do so in behalf of the God
who "interpenetrates" the "other world that now is." 30
There is an obvious sense, of course, in which the point I am making is nothing new. Christian theologians of all persuasions seem to
have recognized in all ages that God is an odd sort of being, indeed—a
being distinctively perplexing in his unwillingness to be subdivided. It
matters not where we turn. We may consider the trinitarian and Christological controversies of the patristic age or the scholastic problem of
faith and reason or the question of free will and determinism posed by
the Reformation. In all cases, however, the task of the theologian
seems always to have been that of rendering intelligible man's relationship to a God who is forever overflowing custom's bounds. Thus the
theologian has been likewise forever called to distinguish without dividing, to lay a claim to the human and a claim to the divine, but not to
do so "superficially"—to do so, rather, in such a way as to allow for a
communicatio idiomatum, for the immanence yet transcendence, the
sameness yet otherness, the "in" of the "out," and the "out" of the
"in" of this strange one called God. It should be stressed, perhaps,
that this "call" applies only to the Christian theologian and not (necessarily, at least) to the philosopher of religion—moreover, only to the
theologian who intends to remain faithful to tradition. What degree of
such faithfulness is acceptable today is an encyclopedic topic in itself,
30

Though they are similar in several respects, Coleridgean polarity and the dipolar theism of contemporary process-theologies should therefore be distinguished. Where the
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the consideration of which would carry us far beyond the scope of the
present subject. It will suffice here, I hope, if I make but two observations: first, that some faithfulness is clearly required, lest our reinterpretations and correlations become mere substitutions; and, second, that
even the least degree of faithfulness to tradition must surely involve the
theologian's recognizing at some point the decisiveness of Christ's
"two natures." It is in light of these two beliefs, and these two natures,
that I have hinted several times at the centrality of Christology, and it
is in this light, too, that polarity and Christology seem to have
embraced in Coleridge's mind.
Theology today, however much we may blame it for poor management of its subject, has, in a way, been no different from traditional
thought. Despite its problems, problems extending, as we know, even
to the reality of God, this theology has retained its recognition of the
need for balance. Yet it seems to have done so in much the same
fashion as we would expect of a committee, by delegating different
responsibilities to different individuals and schools of thought to be performed at different times and places. And so, we have, in general, the
picture I have sketched: a picture of two opposing methods, one struggling to affirm the inwardness of God, the other his transcendence.
Where some have found it necessary to resist the alter for the sake of
the idem, dogmatic authority (let us say) in behalf of subjective autonomy; others have, in their turn, and in the face of a resulting and debilitating human pride, found it no less essential that the idem be avoided
in deference to the alter, that subjectivity be set aside in preference to
objective revelation. And so it goes. The cycle is apparently not yet
ended.
What must be done and what thoughts need thinking seem fairly
clear. If it is to break free from its present cycle, and if it is to maintain its contact with tradition, theology today must continue to search,
as it seems to have been doing for the greater part of its recent history,
for a means of breaking the stalemate between its reductionists and
deductionists, while successfully resisting the threats of its skeptical critics. Christian theology seems still in need of a method of knowing
that will enable it to see beyond its present apportionments of God to a
depth and an inwardness of things inside each other. The challenge, of
course, is awesome, and it must not be thought that this essay pretends
to have done much more than to state, again, the task itself.
And yet, I certainly hope to have accomplished something more.
In the first place, I hope, with Coleridge, to have renewed our appreciation for the forms of knowing in everything we know, for the modes
and manners of perception beneath all of our conceptions. In this
respect, I join the company of those attempting to appropriate, especially, the insights of phenomenology. The efforts of Husserl himself,
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for example, not just in going beyond the "naturalistic standpoint" to
"lived experience," but, first, in recognizing that naturalism is precisely
a standpoint, one among others, are efforts Coleridge would have cer
tainly applauded and efforts we might do well to make our own. Like
Husserl, I believe, theologians must "permit no authority to deprive us
of the right of recognizing all kinds of intuition as equally valuable
sources for the justification of knowledge, not even that of 'modern
natural science.'" 31 Coleridge's attempts to show the penultimacy of
solids and surfaces can be seen, in this context, as an important contri
bution to the questioning and bracketing of such scientific authority.
Second, I hope, in discussing the idea of polarity, to have sug
gested in particular how very much our habitual sense of material
exclusions may have contributed to our present notions of God, man,
and world, and to have made it seem less unlikely that our now dom
inant, empirical perceptions can be made to change. Those who think
themselves most free from past restrictions are often, ironically, those
who are most resistant to change, and this fact applies especially to con
temporary theologians, who seem almost unanimous in their submis
sion to the authority of empirical cognition, and thus to the normative
reality of physical objects. Even in the very midst of our searches for a
language that will be true to something more than concrete fact, it is
concrete fact primarily that we seem obliged, as though by a kind of
tacit compact, to preserve, in all our fearful whisperings about the rela
tive and secular. But Coleridgean polarity offers us a most salutary
reminder; it reminds us, in the words of Ernst Cassirer, that "man lives
with objects only in so far as he lives with these forms," that "it is not a
question of what we see in a certain perspective, but of the perspective
itself."32 The theology of Coleridge's "finger-philosophers" need not
be absolute.
Finally, I would hope to have helped us glimpse a new agenda for
theological thinking, an agenda that is really the recovery of something
old. For I hope to have shown that Christian theology is faced now, as
always, with the problem, not of where to look for God—whether,
today, on the near or the far side of subjectivity—but of how to look:
beyond location and position, with polar sight, toward an experience of
mutual inwardness. If we are to retain our traditional allegiances both
to God's divinity and otherness and to his being truly known, his fami
liarity and likeness, then a beginning must be made, I believe, as it was
made by Kant, with nothing less than the "forms of intuition" and
31
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shapes of our perception—though not, like Kant, with the expectation
that those forms and shapes are fixed. A beginning needs to be made
at a level far deeper than most current, even phenomenological, metho
dologies have seemed to allow, a level where surface gives way to
unity. Because he challenges surface, and because he offers, in return,
a method of seeing into unity, Samuel Taylor Coleridge may very well
prove a key to a renewed theology's search for the vision and
knowledge of God.
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